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PATENT INELIGIBILITY: MAINTAINING A
SCIENTIFIC PUBLIC DOMAIN
EILEEN M. KANEt
I. THE THRESHOLD INQUIRY IN PATENT LAW
Patent eligibility is a doctrine which often surfaces when
new technologies or scientific imperatives create the possibility of
patenting novel forms of subject matter. Its relative dormancy
should not be mistaken for obsolescence. The patentable subject
matter inquiry defines the eligibility of a proposed invention for
patent protection.' Patentable subject matter is statutorily
defined as "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof."2 A gatekeeping role for the patentable subject matter
inquiry is legitimately inferred from its place in the numbering of
statutory requirements for a patent as 35 U.S.C. § 101; however,
the grant of a patent follows an examination of an invention and
its patent application for compliance with all formal statutory
requirements. 3  The recognition of a hierarchy of statutory
requirements in patent law has been stated explicitly: "The first
door which must be opened on the difficult path to patentability
is § 101,"'4 and has been rephrased as "[w]hat kind of an
invention or discovery is it?"5 In Parker v. Flook, the Supreme
t Assistant Professor of Law, Penn State Dickinson School of Law. Ph.D.,
Cornell University; J.D., Fordham University School of Law. The author thanks
Rochelle Dreyfuss, Arti Rai, and Mark Lemley for thoughful comments and
suggestions. Erin Gilsbach provided excellent research assistance.
1 See, e.g., 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.01 (2005) (treatise
section devoted to 35 U.S.C. § 101).
2 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
3 The relevant specific provisions of the patent statute are: 35 U.S.C. § 101
(2000) (patentable subject matter and utility), 35 U.S.C. § 102 (novelty), 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 (nonobviousness), and 35 U.S.C. § 112 (written description, enablement, best
mode, and definiteness).
4 In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979), vacated sub nom. Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980), affld, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
5 Id. (emphasis in original).
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Court stated: "The obligation to determine what type of
discovery is sought to be patented must precede the
determination of whether that discovery is, in fact, new or
obvious."6  Patentable subject matter within the bounds of 35
U.S.C. § 101 must be new, nonobvious, and useful, and each of
these inquiries are legally distinct. In that sense, the term
"patentable" subject matter is a term both narrowly and broadly
used, but in its narrow formal interpretation, it represents an
invention that meets the criteria of 35 U.S.C. § 101, as opposed to
meeting all the other statutory requirements in order to be
"patentable."7
The present vitality of the patentable subject matter inquiry
bears some examination, in view of its relative invisibility within
the scheme of patent procurement and litigation.8 Its relative
obscurity has several sources. Most clearly, many regard the
signature battles over patentable subject matter to have ended.
The emerging software and biotechnology industries of the 1970s
and 1980s generated an intense period of legal scrutiny over the
bounds of patentable subject matter for these technical fields,
culminating in landmark decisions from the Supreme Court.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty,9 issued in 1980, resolved the issue as to
whether genetically engineered microorganisms were proper
patentable subject matter. The court answered in the
affirmative, approvingly quoting from the legislative history of
the 1952 Patent Act to find a Congressional intent that
patentable subject matter "include[s] anything under the sun
that is made by man."10
This is not to suggest that § 101 has no limits or that it
embraces every discovery. The laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable.
Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant
found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise,
6 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978).
7 The term "statutory subject matter" is also used to define an invention that
meets the criteria of 35 U.S.C. § 101.
8 See, e.g., John A. Allison & Mark R. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the
Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 208 (1998) (presenting data on the
grounds for invalidity most frequently cited in their study of patent litigation). For
further discussion, see infra Part II.
9 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
10 Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923,
at 6 (1952)).
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Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E = mc2; nor
could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such
discoveries are "manifestations of ... nature, free to all men
and reserved exclusively to none."'
The Court next addressed software or computer-related
inventions in Diamond v. Diehr,12 which examined whether a
computer program using the Arrhenius equation to determine
the curing time for rubber was properly rejected for lack of
patentable subject matter because it might preempt a
mathematical formula. The Court decided that it did not, stating
"we do not view respondents' claims as an attempt to patent a
mathematical formula, but rather to be drawn to an industrial
process for the molding of rubber products."13 Diehr's invention
employed an equation, but did not preempt the equation. It
remained available for other technological uses. This decision
was the last word from the Supreme Court on computer-related
inventions as patentable subject matter, and it signaled an
increasing accommodation of the patent system to the
technological realities of the computer age. 14
Both Chakrabarty and Diehr stood as portals to the inclusion
of new technologies in biotechnology and software as patentable
subject matter. However, as momentous as each decision was at
the time, the decisions did not end the debates over patentable
subject matter in these fields. For biotechnology, the debate
continued as Chakrabarty was read to be limited to
microorganisms, not addressing the patenting of higher life forms
and not addressing the patentability of DNA.' 5 For software,
11 Id. (citations omitted).
12 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
13 Id. at 192-93.
14 The decision also occurred a year after the finding of patentable subject
matter in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
15 For further discussion of the patentable subject matter debates in
biotechnology, see generally Lori B. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing
Commercial Incentives with Health Needs, 2 HoUs. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 65 (2002)
(investigating the issues surrounding gene patents including scientific development,
patient care, and international trade); Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions
Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469 (2003)
(exploring the ramifications of patent law's moral utility doctrine on controversial
biotechnology patents); Karl Bozicevic, Distinguishing "Products of Nature" from
Products Derived from Nature, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 415 (1987)
(noting that biochemical subject matter is no less entitled to patent protection than
those inventions composed of mechanical or electrical engineering, as both are
derived from natural occurrences); John M. Cowley & Roberte Makowski, Back to the
2006]
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patent applicants continued to spar with the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) as Diehr was read to allow the patenting
of an application of an equation to a specific technological end,
but not to allow the patenting of algorithms in general. 16 After
Future: Rethinking the Product of Nature Doctrine as a Barrier to Biotechnology
Patents, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 301 (2003) (Part I) [hereinafter Cowley
& Makowski, Back to the Future: Part 1] (arguing that while much biotechnology
subject matter has been held to be patentable there exists distinct categories of
patents that have been wrongly granted); John M. Cowley & Roberte Makowski,
Back to the Future: Rethinking the Product of Nature Doctrine as a Barrier to
Biotechnology Patents, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 371 (2003) (Part II)
[hereinafter Cowley & Makowski, Back to the Future: Part II] (same); Michael D.
Davis, The Patenting of Products of Nature, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
293 (1995) (proposing a narrow scope of protection on patent claims for products of
nature); Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix:
A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 303 (2002) (analyzing the grant of property rights over chemical and
biological components of living organisms and its effect on scientific research and
development); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in
Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987) (explaining how the disclosure
mandates of patent law reinforce scientific norms by promoting the publication of
scientific discoveries); Eileen M. Kane, Splitting the Gene: DNA Patents and the
Genetic Code, 71 TENN. L. REV. 707 (2004) (analyzing the patentability of genes with
respect to judicially established exclusions from patentable subject matter); Arti K.
Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827 (1999) (arguing that the CAFC's failure to understand
new technologies in the realm of biotechnology has lead to the misapplication of
patent law doctrine to this field).
16 For further discussion of the patentable subject matter debates in computer-
related inventions, see generally Vincent Chiapetta, Patentability of Computer
Software Instruction as an 'Article of Manufacture:" Software as Such as the Right
Stuff, 17. J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 89 (1998) (suggesting that software
used as an instructional program for a computer constitutes patentable subject
matter while software used in the linguistic sense does not); Donald S. Chisum, The
Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV 959 (1986) (contending that
algorithms should be patentable matter if meeting the requirements of novelty and
unobviousness as such protection would provide an incentive for innovations in
software development); Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of
Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of "Lock-Out" Programs,
68. S. CAL. L. REV. 1091 (1995) (analyzing the protection of computer programs
under both patent and copyright law and proposing necessary adjustments); Richard
S. Gruner, Intangible Inventions: Patentable Subject Matter for an Information Age,
35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 355 (2002) (proposing new criteria on which to distinguish
inventions having intangible content from unpatentable intellectual and scientific
discoveries); Lee A. Hollaar, Justice Douglas Was Right: The Need for Congressional
Action on Software Patents, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 283 (1996) (resuscitating the call to
Congress to clarify the patentability of software-based inventions and suggesting
amendments to the patent statute ); Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and
Copyright Subject Matter, 35 CONN. L. REV. 439 (2003) (advocating the inclusion of
useful, non-physical processes as patentable subject matter as a means of
maintaining a critical distinction from copyright subject matter); Robert A. Kreiss,
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two more decades of conflict, the Federal Circuit decided that an
algorithm is patentable subject matter in AT & T Corp. v. Excel
Communications, Inc.17  In tandem with a steadily more
permissive attitude toward patentable subject matter in
biotechnology and computer-related inventions, judicially-created
doctrines of subject matter exclusion that were previously
thought to bar the issuance of patents have steadily been
eliminated, such as the prohibition against the patenting of
business methods.' 8
The continuing vitality of the patentable subject matter
doctrine has been addressed in legal scholarship. There is
commentary to the effect that the issue of patentable subject
matter may now be the least vital doctrine in the set of statutory
requirements for patentability, particularly with respect to
certain technical fields. 19 However, in contrast, there is also
recent commentary that urges employment of the patentable
subject matter doctrine in order to set limits in the patenting of
biotechnology 20 and computer-related inventions. 21
Patent Protection for Computer Programs and Mathematical Algorithms: The
Constitutional Limitations on Patentable Subject Matter, 29 N.M. L. REV. 31 (1999)
(identifying constitutionally-based limits on eligibility from patent jurisprudence
particularly relevant for determining whether computer programs and mathematical
algorithms are patentable subject matter); Allen Newell, Response: The Models are
Broken, The Models are Broken!, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1023 (1986) (responding to
Professor Chisum's article in the same volume that the basic conceptual models for
understanding the patentability of algorithms are severely inadequate); Pamela
Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms
and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMoRY L.J. 1025 (1990)
[hereinafter Samuelson, Benson Revisited] (elucidating Benson to analyze historical
limitations in patent law that undermine the legitimacy of protection for software
inventions); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection
of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994) (advocating a sui generis
approach to legal protection of computer programs that would guard valuable
aspects of computer programs that are vulnerable to imitation).
17 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
18 See infra Part III.
19 See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the
Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2001) ("With some eighty thousand software
patents already issued, the Federal Circuit endorsing patentability without
qualification, and the Supreme Court assiduously avoiding the question, software
patentability is a matter for the history books.").
20 Recent scholarship has suggested reliance on the prohibitions against
patenting "products of nature" or 'laws of nature" in order to limit any harmful
effects of DNA patents, or on the patentable subject matter doctrine more generally.
See John H. Barton, Patents, Genomics, Research and Diagnostics, 77 AcAD. MED.
1339, 1343 (2002) (arguing for the relevance of the patentable subject matter
doctrine in restricting the harmful effects of genomic patent); Cowley & Makowski,
20061
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There is an aspect of the patentable subject matter debate
that is distinctive in the scheme of statutory requirements in
patent law and worth attention. The doctrine is the locus for
considering the commodification of scientific subject matter in
general. 22 Is it proper to regard scientific knowledge or research
tools as subjects of intellectual property? Should such knowledge
be privately controlled? From the perspective of patent law,
these questions are best answered at the level of patentable
subject matter-deciding what sort of inventions may qualify for
a patent. If one regards the patentable subject matter doctrine
Back to the Future: Part II, supra note 15, at 395 (arguing for revitalization of the
product of nature doctrine, suggesting that it has been unevenly applied and should
be tested against DNA patents); Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 15, at 390
(arguing for a more rigorous "substantial transformation test" that would require a
product of nature to be significantly altered from its natural state to quality for
patenting); Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time
for an Experimental Use Defense Arrived? 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457, 468 (2004)
(specifying that statutory exceptions for "fundamental principles of science and for
products of nature" could be enacted, although noting the difficult line-drawing
involved); Kane, supra note 15, at 753 (discussing the law of nature exclusion for the
biological sciences, suggesting application of the prohibition against patenting laws
of nature to preclude DNA patents which preempt the genetic code); Arti K. Rai &
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 299 (2003) (suggesting that the product of nature doctrine be
"reinvigorate[d]" so as to test the patent eligibility of DNA and other molecules in
biotechnology).
21 Recent scholarship questions the suitability of patents for computer-related
inventions. See Jay Dratler, Jr., Does Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case Against
Software and Business-Method Patents, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 823 (2003)
(criticizing patents on computer programs, proposing a standard of "technological
risk" to justify patent grants); Russell Moy, A Case Against Software Patents, 17
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 67, 96-99 (2000) (recommending that
statutory subject matter exclude software patents, noting the availability of
copyright protection); see also Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 16, at 1029-
36.
22 This observation has particular resonance in the biological sciences. For
example, the commodification of biological materials further implicates such
developments as organ banks, tissue repositories, gamete banks, and embryo
transactions, and generates debate over the propriety of applying an economic
calculus to the valuation of natural products. See, e.g., LORI B. ANDREWS & DOROTHY
NELKIN, THE BODY BAZAAR: THE MARKET FOR HUMAN TISSUE IN THE
BIOTECHNOLOGY AGE (2001) (considering developments in medical science that
allow the sale and transfer of biological materials); BRONWYN PARRY, TRADING THE
GENOME: INVESTIGATING THE COMMODIFICATION OF BIO-INFORMATION (2004)
(discussing the international controversies over the control of genetic resources);
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1936 (1987)
(analyzing varying degrees of commodification that are commensurate with
personhood).
[Vol. 80:519
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as the patent law version of "standing,"23 then its gate-keeping
function is revealed, and the import of conflicts over the
boundaries of patentable subject matter becomes clear.24
The Article next considers how the limits of patentable
subject matter are defined and tested, both procedurally and
substantively. Part II traces some of the invisibility of the
patentable subject matter doctrine to the difficulties with which
some litigants and courts have handled the issue of patentable
subject matter during patent litigation, noting recent judicial
developments that have recognized patent eligibility conflicts.
Part III examines the exclusions from patentable subject matter,
with a focus on the Supreme Court's mandate that "laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" are not
patentable as a form of ineligibility that protects scientific
knowledge from private control. Part IV specifically concentrates
on the patent ineligibility of laws of nature as an important limit
for the public domain in the biological sciences, considering its
interpretation in patent jurisprudence and in scholarship from
the philosophy of science. Part V concludes that the patentable
subject matter doctrine is alive and well, as evidenced by recent
developments in the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, and
proposes that the patent ineligibilities be codified for the critical
project of maintaining the scientific public domain, analogous to
the statutory exclusions from copyright. The reductionist
imperatives of modern scientific research suggest that conflicts
over patentable subject matter will continue to shape the
boundary between public and private knowledge.
II. CONFLICTS OVER PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
There are several formal sources of conflict over patentable
subject matter which present opportunities for understanding
how the doctrine functions as the threshold standard for
patentability. Collectively, these conflicts provide the raw
material for doctrinal formation and illuminate the sparse
language in the enabling statutory provision.25
In the PTO, a patent applicant encounters the statutory
requirement for patentable subject matter during patent
23 See Kane, supra note 15, at 725.
24 See Bagley, supra note 15, at 543 (discussing how the patentable subject
matter doctrine could be used to limit "morally controversial" patents).
25 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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prosecution. However, conflict is not to be expected in most
patenting efforts, a conclusion which is reflected in the current
PTO guidelines for patent examiners. 26 The document presents
the simple statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and then
proceeds with detailed instructions for the specific examination
of biotechnology and computer-related inventions. 27
If a conflict with the PTO occurs through a rejection by the
patent examiner for lack of patentable subject matter, a
dissatisfied patent applicant can then appeal to the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences. 28 Following a final rejection
from the PTO for lack of patentable subject matter, an applicant
can undertake a civil action in the District Court for the District
of Columbia 29 or can take an appeal to the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit.30 However, when the PTO (at the examiner
or administrative appeal level) refuses to issue a patent for lack
of patentable subject matter, the existence of such a conflict may
be indicative of the PTO's wider resistance to the eligibility of
subject matter in an entire technical field. The landmark
26 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (8th ed. 2001), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/
index.htm.
27 Id. Chapter 2100, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/
documents/2100.htm. This section contains specific subsections for "Living Subject
Matter" and "Computer-Related Inventions" as the only detailed guidelines for the
determination of patentable subject matter. Id. Professor Kreiss has noted that the
PTO Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478
(Feb. 28, 1996), give short shrift to the issue of patentable subject matter. Kreiss,
supra note 16, at 54 ("A closer reading, however, suggests that the PTO has
deliberately adopted a view minimizing, if not quite eliminating, the subject matter
inquiry."). However, recent developments have prompted a renewed focus from the
PTO on patentable subject matter. The case of Ex parte Lundgren, Appeal No. 2003-
2088 (B.P.A.I. 2004) (involving a patent on a method of manager compensation, an
invention not necessarily in the technological arts), was followed by the issuance of
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION OF
PATENT APPLICATIONS FOR PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY, 1300 OFF. GAz.
PAT. OFFICE 142 (November 22, 2005). For further discussion of Ex parte Lundgren,
see infra note 132.
28 35 U.S.C. § 134(a). It should be noted that the Board is charged with
determining the patentability of any invention that is the subject of an interference.
See 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2000) (stating "[t]he Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
shall, on written appeal of an applicant, review adverse decisions of examiners upon
applications for patents and shall determine priority and patentability of invention
in interferences declared under section 135(a)").
29 Id. § 145.
30 Id. § 141. Prior to 1982, such appeals were taken to the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.).
[Vol. 80:519
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Supreme Court cases in biotechnology and software involved
conflicts between applicants and the PTO over patentable subject
matter in developing technologies. 31
The federal district courts can encounter the patentable
subject matter doctrine in civil actions for patent infringement. 32
An accused infringer can allege invalidity of the claims of the
patent in suit on the basis of a lack of patentable subject
matter.33 It is instructive to analyze some of these disputes at
the trial court level to uncover ease or difficulty in the
application of the doctrine. Formal emergence of the patentable
subject matter issue in patent litigation means that one of the
parties to the dispute is making such an allegation, or that the
court has taken notice of the possible relevance of the issue to the
litigation. However, there are cases where what can be labeled
"informal" assertions are made that have overtones of a
patentable subject matter controversy. 34
Modern empirical research on patent litigation has
attempted to describe and quantify the nature of many patent
disputes in order to discover what bases are asserted for
invalidity. A study of litigated patent cases revealed that the
assertion of a lack of patentable subject matter accounted for
only 0.7% of the invalid patents in the study, in contrast to other
more frequently asserted bases. 35
31 Computer-related inventions were presented to the Court in Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972), Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 587 (1978), and
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 181 (1981). Recombinant DNA technology was
presented to the Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305-06 (1980).
Although the PTO continued to reject software-related patent applications after
Diehr, and applicants prevailed at the C.C.P.A., the PTO did not appeal these later
losses to the Supreme Court, a fact that also explains the absence of any Supreme
Court cases on patentable subject matter between 1981, see Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175 (1981), and 2001, see J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intl., Inc.,
534 U.S. 124 (2001). See ROBERT S. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND
POLICY 151 (3d ed. 2002) (noting shift in executive branch policies regarding PTO
appeals to the Supreme Court).
32 35 U.S.C. § 281.
33 Id. § 282.
34 Such cases cannot necessarily be identified by searching for all cases that
mention 35 U.S.C. § 101, for many of these cases do not recognize or mention this
statutory provision. Therefore, searches of the federal district court databases for
cases discussing "patentable subject matter," "natural phenomena," "law of nature,"
or "abstract ideas" have been undertaken to identify latent or informal assertions of
lack of patentable subject matter.
35 Allison & Lemley, supra note 8, at 208 tbl.1. Note that this statistic
represents patents judged invalid in their study. The number stands in contrast to
2006]
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The issue of patentable subject matter has several
dimensions that distinguish it from the other possible doctrines
that can be considered as bases for patent invalidity, and which
might account for its relative invisibility during litigation. 36
First, the threshold nature of the patentable subject matter
requirement might result in undue reliance on the PTO
determination that patentable subject matter existed in granting
the patent, a view that might influence the confidence of a
litigant (or a court) considering raising the issue.37 However, in
addition to that source of hesitation, there appear to be some
difficulties for litigants in identifying a lack of patentable subject
matter as a distinct statutory basis for invalidity, even when a
colorable assertion could be made. Several leading practitioner's
handbooks offer cursory treatment of the doctrine of patentable
subject matter, in comparison to fuller exploration of other
statutory grounds available for assertions of invalidity and
unenforceability. 38 In addition to the unfamiliarity with the
patentable subject matter doctrine that can be evidenced by
parties in litigation, there is another distinguishing
characteristic of this issue. Many patent disputes are between
similarly situated competitors, who may be in conflict over a
particular patent, but in agreement regarding the general
eligibility of subject matter in a particular field. The
consequences of a determination that patentable subject matter
statutory grounds more routinely asserted such as obviousness (42.0%) or 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 non-prior art (3 1.1%). Id.
36 The other statutory bases for alleging patent invalidity are utility (35 U.S.C.
§ 101), novelty (35 U.S.C. § 102), nonobviousness (35 U.S.C. § 103) and disclosure
defects (35 U.S.C. § 112, first and second paragraphs).
37 In view of the analysis by Professor Kreiss, there may be assumptions by a
court about the rigor of the examination process that are not valid. See Kreiss, supra
note 16, at 54-56. See, e.g., Etak, Inc. v. Zexel USA Corp., No. C 94-4041 SC, 1995
WL 462240, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 1995) ("Without any contrary evidence, this
court assumes that the PTO, in accordance with the Guidelines, considered the
algorithm and the issue of patentability in issuing the patent.").
38 "Thus, a patent may be held invalid under § 101 for lack of patentable subject
matter." AM. BAR ASS'N SECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW, PATENT LITIGATION
STRATEGIES HANDBOOK 471 (Barry L. Grossman & Gary M. Hoffman eds., 2000).
Another type of defense involves failure to satisfy the requirements of 35
U.S.C. § 101 which defines the subject matter that can be protected by a
utility patent as 'any new. . . thereof.' [Two] different defenses may be
asserted under this section-that the subject matter of the accused patent
lies outside the statutory subject matter identified in section 101.
Roy E. Hafer & Tom Filarski, Patent Defenses, in PATENT LITIGATION, PRACTICING
LAW INSTITUTE ch. 21 (Laurence H. Pretty ed., 2001).
[Vol. 80:519
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does not exist might extend beyond the particular patent in suit,
resulting in hesitation on the part of either party (or the courts)
to raise the issue for fear of sector-wide consequences. 39
The following cases illustrate various scenarios in which the
doctrine of patentable subject matter has surfaced in patent
litigation, either implicitly or explicitly. 40  These cases, in
contrast to those emanating from appeals of patent denials by
the PTO, offer a window into how ably parties do, or do not,
handle a possible patentable subject matter dispute. They also
reveal how well the trial courts are able to discern the discrete
statutory requirement for patentable subject matter, and
adjudicate accordingly.
The potential appearance of an issue of patentable subject
matter can be observed in Kemin Foods, L.C. v. Pigmentos
Vegetales del Centro S.A. DE.41 The '714 and '564 patents were
directed to purified lutein crystals, and methods for their
production. The defendant had asserted several grounds for
invalidity of the patents, including anticipation and obviousness.
After a jury trial, the patent was judged valid and infringed. The
court then considered post-trial motions filed by the parties.
Specifically, the court discussed an assertion made by the
defendant: "Further, PIVEG asserts that the scope of patentable
subject matter does not include discoveries of natural phenomena
because '[s]uch discoveries are 'manifestations of ... nature, free
to all men and reserved exclusively to none.'' "42 The court
mentioned the defendant's contention "that the jury's decision
was contrary to law to the extent it believed claim 1 of the '564
patent was valid because it was drawn to the scientific discovery
of producing large crystals."43 There is no indication by the court
that such an assertion could have been interpreted as a claim of
invalidity for lack of patentable subject matter, pursuant to the
39 See Kane, supra note 15, at 726 (analogizing this cascade of consequence to
that of class actions).
40 These cases are illustrative, not exhaustive. For reasons that are clear from
the examples, however, it is not possible to identify all of the cases in which a latent
issue of patentable subject matter exists because of the linguistic imprecision that
attaches to any such considerations from the parties and/or the courts.
41 357 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (S.D. Iowa 2005).
42 Id. at 1135-36 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)
(quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)))
(alteration in original).
43 Id. at 1136.
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distinct statutory ground afforded by 35 U.S.C. § 101. The
plaintiff patent owner urged a denial of defendant's motion "as it
[was] based on a newly asserted, post-verdict anticipation theory,
a defense never raised at trial."44 It does not appear that the
defendant recognized the specific statutory basis of 35 U.S.C.
§ 101-albeit fatally late in the proceedings-and neither the
plaintiff, nor, importantly, the court, appears to have countered
with any such recognition. While it could be argued that the
failure to specify the precise statutory provision that corresponds
to a substantive argument is not required, its absence suggests a
lack of appreciation for the patentable subject matter doctrine
that caused it to be omitted as a formal ground for invalidity
despite an inference, from the defendant, that the invention
lacked patentable subject matter. To be sure, such a conclusion
does not suggest that any such formal assertion might have been
successful, only that the defendant's claim that "natural
phenomena" might have been patented is striking, as it
corresponds to one of the clear exclusions from patentable subject
matter. 45
In Monsanto Co. v. Good,46 a defendant accused of infringing
a patent directed to DNA, a chimeric gene, appears to raise
arguments regarding patentable subject matter, but does not
offer 35 U.S.C. § 101 as a statutory ground for invalidity.
Furthermore, the defendant erroneously posed such arguments,
in its motion for summary judgment, as directed to the
enforceability of the patent-an error that was noted by the
court.47 The defendant's claims that such a gene should not be
patentable because "[g]enetic sequence data relating to plants
and seeds is not patentable," 48 and because "it attempts to patent
a DNA construct that is not in its 'pure and isolated form,' 49
were not raised with reference to 35 U.S.C. § 101, but, according
44 Id.
45 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) ("This Court has undoubtedly
recognized limits to § 101 and every discovery is not embraced within the statutory
terms. Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas.").
46 No. Civ.A.01-5678 FLW, 2004 WL 1664013 (D. N.J. July 23, 2004).
47 Id. at *4 ("As an initial matter, the Court notes that [the defendant]
inappropriately characterizes its challenge as an enforcement issue.").
48 Id. (alteration in original).
49 Id. (quoting Defendant's Notice of Cross-Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment at 7, Monsanto, 2004 WL 1664013 (No. Civ.A.01-5678 FLW)).
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to the court, relied on the case of Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai
Pharmaceutical Co.,5° in which the Federal Circuit addressed the
patentability of "purified and isolated DNA."51 The court stated
that a "man-made gene" was at issue in the case, holding Amgen
inapplicable, and then noted that 35 U.S.C. § 101 was
implicated.52 The court then relied on Diamond v. Chakrabarty53
for its conclusion that "genes altered by man" are patentable. 54
Despite the absence of the defendant's assertion of 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, the court does locate the defendant's arguments in that
provision, and, indeed, compensates for the assertion of
unenforceability by entertaining the arguments, and finding
patentable subject matter. 55
The issue of patentable subject matter, however, is not
always latent or overlooked by litigants at the district court level.
There are cases, of course, where a question regarding patentable
subject matter is identified early, and definitively-thus forming
a basis for a claim of patent invalidity by an accused infringer
during litigation. Not surprisingly, such lower court cases
include those which have recently shaped the contours of
patentable subject matter, including State Street Bank & Trust
Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.,56 a successful declaratory
judgment action by a potential infringer alleging invalidity on
this ground, AT & T Corp. v Excel Communications, Inc.,57 where
the court granted the motion of an accused infringer for summary
judgment of invalidity for lack of patentable subject matter, and
50 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
51 Id. at 1206.
52 Monsanto, 2004 WL 1664013, at *4-5.
53 447 U.S. 303 (1980). Chakrabarty did not address genes as patentable subject
matter; it addressed a genetically engineered bacterium that had been altered by
recombinant DNA techniques. Id. at 305.
54 Monsanto, 2004 WL 1664013, at *5.
55 Id. It can be further noted that the assertion of a "chimeric gene" in the
patent, and its discussion by the court, is open to interpretation, as claim 1 of U.S.
Patent No. 5,352,605 is directed to a chimeric construct which includes a viral
promoter with any gene of interest. U.S. Patent No. 5,352,605 (filed Oct. 28, 1993).
Such a construct may or may not be chimeric, but there is an argument that the
gene is not, per se, chimeric, but rather unaltered, and arguments about the
patentability of the gene itself are not obviated by the language of Claim 1.
56 927 F. Supp. 502 (D. Mass. 1996) (concerning the patentability of business
methods).
57 No. 96-434-SLR, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5346 (D. Del. Mar. 27, 1998)
(concerning the patentability of algorithms).
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Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. v. J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc.,58
where the court denied summary judgment to a defendant
alleging invalidity on the same basis.
If a litigant does not allege (or imply) invalidity for lack of
patentable subject matter, despite a cognizable claim in a
particular case, it is possible for a court to raise the issue sua
sponte. 59  In the case of Safe Flight Instrument Corp. v.
Sundstrand Data Control, Inc.,60 the holder of patents to
computer systems for monitoring wind shear in aircraft sued for
infringement. The defendant asserted non-infringement of the
patent, and moved for summary judgment. The patent claim to a
method of producing a wind shear signal included the steps
involved in the necessary calculations. The defendant did not
advance any theory of invalidity for lack of patentable subject
matter.61  The plaintiff patent owner opposed summary
judgment, contending that an issue of material fact attended to
whether the defendant's products actually produced a wind shear
signal, which would then infringe its patent. Judge Roth
characterized the plaintiffs allegation as asserting actual
ownership of any means for producing a signal identifying the
presence of wind shear. She then identified an issue of
patentable subject matter necessitating adjudication sua sponte,
noting that "Safe Flight cannot patent the concept of
windshear."6 2  After reviewing the relevance of Diamond v.
Diehr,63 the judge noted that "Safe Flight describes its method for
calculating windshear alternatively as an algorithm or an
algebraic expression. Unlike the respondents in Diehr, the
plaintiff here does seek to preempt use of the general windshear
equation."6 4  The judge distinguished the application of an
equation from preemption of the same:
58 No. C 98-4016-DEO, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21782 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 19, 1998)
(concerning the availability of utility patent protection for plants).
59 "Sua sponte"-in Latin, meaning "of his or its own will"-refers here to a
legal issue that originates by action of a court, in contrast to an issue raised by a
party. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1424 (6th ed. 1990).
60 706 F. Supp. 1146 (D. Del. 1989).
61 Id. at 1147-48. This 1989 case occurred during the period of extensive
litigation over the patentability of computer-related inventions. See Chiapetta, supra
note 16, at 106-14.
62 Safe Flight, 706 F. Supp. at 1154.
63 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
64 Safe Flight, 706 F. Supp. at 1155-56 (citation omitted).
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Safe Flight can patent the use of the windshear signal in its
airplane control systems once that signal has been produced, as
long as it seeks protection for the use of the windshear equation
in conjunction with all of the other steps in the system. It
cannot, however, as it seeks to do here, prevent others from
using the equation which simply describes a natural
phenomenon. 65
Notably, the judge addressed the absence of any claim by the
defendant that Safe Flight's patent was invalid for lack of
patentable subject matter:
In so finding, we do not comment on the validity of the
plaintiffs patents. The question of whether its patents cover
more than the general windshear equation (and therefore
whether its patents cover patentable subject matter) was not
raised in this dispute and therefore is not addressed by the
Court.
6 6
Judge Roth later commented on this patent case and the role
of the court in safeguarding the availability of a natural
phenomenon and the means for its use: "I felt that to adopt Safe
Fight's [sic] argument would permit Safe Flight in effect to
patent the wind shear equation, which it could not do." 67 The
remedy was described: "I did not comment on the validity of the
plaintiffs patents, I only refused to permit Safe Flight to
preclude others from the use of the general wind shear
equation."6  This case illustrates the action of a court, sua
sponte, recognizing that a patent might effectively foreclose
others from being able to work with the natural phenomenon of
wind shear if an equation for its description were privately
controlled, and choosing to prevent that outcome by equitable
means. The court recognized that such a result would have
contravened the Supreme Court's dictate.69 While the effect of
this ruling preserved the availability of a natural phenomenon,
the lack of an explicit finding regarding patentable subject
65 Id. at 1156.
66 Id. at 1156 n.9.
67 Jane R. Roth, A View From the Bench: Patent and Copyright Protection of
Computers and Computer Programming in the Information Age, 19 TEMP. ENVTL. L.
& TECH. J. 11, 14 (2000). Judge Roth suggested that the Federal Circuit have
jurisdiction over patent and copyright disputes in the computer field in order to
achieve a coherent jurisprudence. Id. at 26.
68 Id. at 15.
69 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
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matter and any effect on patent validity contributes to the
underdevelopment of the doctrine by the courts.
A recent case from the Federal Circuit discussed the issue of
patentable subject matter sua sponte. In SmithKline Beecham
Corp. v. Apotex Corp.,70 a patent dispute between a brand-name
manufacturer and a generic competitor, the plaintiff patent
holder asserted infringement of its patent to paroxetine
hydrochloride hemihydrate, a crystalline form of the drug Paxil.
The theory of infringement was based on the allegation that,
although Apotex would be manufacturing a different (anhydrate)
crystalline form of the drug, a trace amount of the patented
compound would be organically produced during the synthetic
process. The Federal Circuit decided that although the
defendant's conduct did infringe the patent, the claim to the
patented compound was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
inherently anticipated by a prior patent.71 A concurring opinion
by Judge Gajarsa raised the issue of whether the patent claim
should be judged invalid for lack of patentable subject matter,
first reviewing the authority for his decision to raise the issue.
He noted: "The question of patentability under section 101 does
not arise often, and a court's decision to raise it sua sponte is
even less common. The centrality of patentable subject matter to
the entire scope of the patent law suggests that there are times
when such inquiries are critical. '72 Citing the Supreme Court's
decisions in Slawson v. Grand Street Railroad Co. 73 and Richards
v. Chase Elevator Co.74 for the proposition that a court may
always consider the patentability of an invention in dispute in
any legal proceeding, he stated: "These precedents remain good
law, though the courts have relied on them infrequently. The
policy that drove them, however, remains vibrant."75  Judge
Garjarsa considered whether a patent holder can claim
infringement when the allegedly infringing product (paroxetine
hemihydrate) only arises upon spontaneous chemical conversion
of the non-infringing product into a crystalline polymorph. The
question was not whether a synthetic chemical compound could
70 403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
71 Id. at 1345.
72 Id. at 1352-53 (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
73 107 U.S. 649 (1882).
74 158 U.S. 299 (1895).
75 SmithKline, 403 F.3d at 1353 (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
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be patented per se, but rather whether "a natural physical
process can convert a noninfringing product into an infringing
one," 76 and the patent claim would therefore be directed to
subject matter both within and excluded from 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The possibility that "unintentional infringement" can occur
violates the principle of public notice, and Judge Gajarsa stated
that this was a consequence of the lack of patentable subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.77 He viewed the plaintiff as
claiming patent rights to a compound that solely arises from
naturally occurring processes, noting that "[t]his distinction
between the synthetic product and its natural 'reproduction'
process is subtle, but critical."78  Judge Gajarsa reached a
conclusion of invalidity of the patent claim under 35 U.S.C. § 101,
a different basis than did the majority on the panel. The
majority stated that "the concurrence confuses patent eligibility
under § 101 with patentability under other provisions in the
Patent Act"79 and further commented that the scope of the claim
could not be addressed by the patentable subject matter
doctrine.8 0
The contrast between the opinions of the majority and of the
concurrence illustrate an important fact about the appearance of
an issue of patentable subject matter during patent litigation, in
contrast to patent prosecution. The patent claim in SmithKline8 l
may present as a standard claim to a composition of matter, an
allowable category of invention under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and not
trigger any concern from a patent examiner during patent
prosecution. However, the assertion of the patent claim against
an accused infringer revealed a theory of production of the
patented compound that was arguably novel and unexpected,
and, in the view of Judge Gajarsa, raised wholly new questions of
patentable subject matter that had not surfaced in patent
prosecution. It is possible that, during patent litigation, a
particular theory of infringement or a specific claim construction
might expose a legitimate issue regarding patentable subject
76 Id. at 1359.
77 Id. at 1359-60.
78 Id. at 1360.
79 Id. at 1342 (majority opinion).
80 Id.
81 Claim 1 of the '723 patent read: "Crystalline paroxetine hydrochloride
hemihydrate." Id. at 1339.
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matter, revealing a scenario that could not be foreseen at the
time of patent prosecution.
The Supreme Court has recently identified an issue of
patentable subject matter in a patent litigation which lacked any
formal allegation of invalidity for lack of patentable subject
matter. In Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings
(LabCorp) v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. et al,8 2 the holder of a
patent to an assay for identifying a vitamin deficiency by
determining the level of an amino acid asserted infringement of a
method claim which involved measuring the level of
homocysteine and correlating an elevated level with a deficiency
of either cobalamin (Vitamin B12) or folate (folic acid).8 3
Homocysteine metabolism requires a sufficient vitamin level; an
inference of a possible vitamin deficiency can be drawn if the
homocysteine level is elevated. The allegation of indirect
infringement relied on the assertion that LabCorp intentionally
induced infringement of Claim 13 of the patent by publishing
knowledge of the biochemical correlation which promoted the use
of a homocysteine assay by medical practitioners.8 4 The claim
construction endorsed by the Federal Circuit interpreted the
term "correlating" in Claim 13 to occur whenever an individual
made as association between homocysteine and vitamin
deficiency, following the performance of any assay.85 With that
interpretation, the infringement theory relied on a determination
that a doctor, for example, could directly infringe the claim by
making the biochemical correlation. The Federal Circuit upheld
the jury verdict that LabCorp had induced infringement.8 6
LabCorp had alleged the invalidity of the patent claim on
several grounds during litigation, but did not advance any formal
allegation for lack of patentable subject matter.8 7 In the petition
for certiorari filed by the petitioner LabCorp in the Supreme
82 370 F. 3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 601 (2005) (No. 04-
607).
83 Claim 13 of U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658 is as follows: "A method for detecting a
deficiency of cobalamin or folate in warm-blooded animals comprising the steps of:
assaying a body fluid for an elevated level of total homocysteine; and correlating an
elevated level of total homocysteine in said body fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin
or folate." Id. at 1358-59.
84 Id. at 1365.
85 Id. at 1362.
86 Id.
87 Other grounds for invalidity were advanced, however, including written
description, enablement, obviousness, indefiniteness, and anticipation. Id. at 1365.
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Court, the question of whether "a method patent.., can validly
claim a monopoly over a basic scientific relationship" was
articulated.88 The petitioners alleged disclosure defects in a
patent claim to such a relationship, describing the correlation
step as "indefinite, undescribed, and non-enabling."8 9  While
there was no citation of 35 U.S.C. § 101, the petitioners stated in
their petition that "scientific facts and laws of nature are outside
the scope of patentable invention."90  This is a statement
invoking the limits of patentable subject matter. While
considering the petition, the Supreme Court invited the Solicitor
General to file a brief in the case, limited to a newly posed
question that directly invoked its trilogy of exclusions from
patentable subject matter: "Is the patent invalid because one
cannot patent 'laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas'? Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)." 91 With that
sentence, the Court directly signaled its interest in whether the
limits of patentable subject matter had been exceeded by Claim
13, and explicitly shifted the discourse into the trilogy of
exclusions from patentable subject matter that it has
maintained. In response to the Court's question, the Solicitor
General stated that "Claim 13 appears to involve a natural
phenomenon, because it asserts and relies on the existence of a
naturally occurring correlation between elevated levels of total
homocysteine and deficiencies in cobalamin or folate,"92 further
analogizing the relationship to those observed in E=mc2 or
Newton's law of gravitation.93 However, the Solicitor General
88 Question 3, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, LabCorp v. Metabolite, 370 F. 3d
1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 601 (2005) (No. 04-607) at 2; available
at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/files/labcorp-petition-for certiorari.pdf (last
visited November 7, 2005). Question 3 stated: "Whether a method patent setting
forth an indefinite, undescribed, and non-enabling step directing a party simply to
'correlat[e]' test results can validly claim a monopoly over a basic scientific
relationship used in medical treatment such that any doctor necessarily infringes
the patent merely by thinking about the relationship after looking at a test result."
Id.
89 Id. These allegations invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112, first and second paragraphs. Id.
90 Id. at 18.
91 Invitation to Solicitor General, LabCorp v. Metabolite, 543 U.S. 1185
(February 28, 2005).
92 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, LabCorp v. Metabolite, 370 F. 3d
1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 601 (2005) (No. 04-607); available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/osglbriefs/2005/2pet/6invit/2004-0607.pet.ami.inv.html (last
visited November 7, 2005) at 5.
93 Id. at 6. These analogies are important, because they support the recognition
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argued against the petition for certiorari, noting that "petitioner
did not argue below that claim 13 attempts to claim non-
patentable subject matter and is therefore invalid under Section
101," and further stating that this failure precluded any claim
construction undertaken with this allegation at the fore, and
eliminated the existence of a complete record on the issue of
patentable subject matter.94 The brief also noted the implication
of any holding that Claim 13, or similar claims, lack patentable
subject matter, revealing a quasi-class action effect: "A decision
overturning PTO's approach could call into question a
substantial number of patent claims and undermine the settled
expectations of numerous participants in technology-based
industries." 95 In its reply to the Solicitor General's arguments,
the petitioner LabCorp relied on arguments regarding the
inherent jurisdiction of the Court over any issue of patentability,
and further noted the latent assertions regarding patentable
subject matter that did appear in the record, where the trial
court judge had raised the possibility of patenting an "idea"96
during claim construction and again at the Federal Circuit,
where the petitioner had noted the possibility that the patent
holder "would improperly gain a monopoly over a basic scientific
fact."97 LabCorp's reply brief began to adopt the language that
the Court had used, characterizing the lower court's rulings on
the scientific relationship between homocysteine and folate as
relating to a "law of nature" and noting that an allowance of
Claim 13 resulted in preemption of a "natural principle."98  In
response to the warning by the Solicitor General that settled
expectations relating to PTO practice might change, LabCorp
of common cognitive structures between the physical and biological sciences that are
labeled either natural phenomena or laws of nature, neither of which can be
patented. See infra Part IV.
94 Id at 15. The Supreme Court had also granted certiorari against the
recommendation of the Solicitor General over the patentable subject matter issue in
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intl., Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001). See
MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 31, at 119-20 (noting the unexpected grant of
certiorari given the absence of lower court conflict and the Solicitor General opinion).
95 Id. at 14. See generally Kane, supra note 15, at 726.
96 Supplemental Brief for Petitioner in Response to Brief for the United States,
LabCorp v. Metabolite, 370 F. 3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 601
(2005) (No. 04-607) at 7, available at http://docket.medill.northwestern.eduarchivesl
supplemental brief.pdf.
97 Id. at 6.
98 Id. at 3.
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warned about a failure to review Claim 13: "The PTO's
approach, if allowed to stand, would in fact open the floodgates to
monopolization of virtually any scientific correlation merely by
drafting a vague 'test plus correlate' claim."99
The Supreme Court did grant certiorari, limited to the
original Question 3 in the petition, which had focused on the
patenting of a "scientific fact." 100  However, its question to the
Solicitor General had clearly focused attention of the parties on
the relationship of Claim 13 to the defined exclusions of laws of
nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas.101 LabCorp,
then, illustrates the Court's initiative in formulating a specific
question that focused the parties on a possible defect related to
patentable subject matter, and in the familiar language from
Diamond v. Diehr.102 The possible patenting of a scientific
relationship appeared, to the Court, to translate into the
possibility a patent may have breached one of the core exclusions
from patentable subject matter, despite the absence of attention
to this issue at the lower court level. This is not surprising, as
these exclusions originate with the Court and have surfaced to
maintain fundamental scientific tools within the public
domain. 10 3 Again, as SmithKline illustrated, a particular theory
of infringement may expose an issue of patentable subject matter
that was not visible in prosecution and was not fully appreciated
or articulated during litigation. If the ability to raise a formal
allegation related to the boundaries of patentable subject matter
requires a litigant to possess an understanding of the "laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" exclusions, the
omissions of this allegation that are observed in Part II, supra,
may reflect the definitional confusion and underdeveloped
rationales for these exclusions.10 4 This ambiguity is observed in
99 Id. at 9.
100 LabCorp v. Metabolite, 126 S. Ct. 601 (November 2, 2005) (No. 04-607). As of
this writing, the Court has not yet issued an opinion.
101 The law of nature exclusion and its relationship to Claim 13 is discussed in
Part IV, infra.
102 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
103 In an analysis by Donald S. Chisum of the 24 "most relevant decisions" by
the Supreme Court in the field of patent law, 4 addressed the issue of patentable
subject matter. Donald S. Chisum, The Supreme Court and Patent Law: Does
Shallow Reasoning Lead to Thin Air? 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 23-24
(1999).
104 These issues are further explored in Parts III and IV, infra.
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conflicting descriptions of the scientific relationship in LabCorp
as both a natural phenomenon and law of nature. 10 5
Although the absence of a formal allegation regarding
patentable subject matter may deprive a particular litigant of a
valuable defense in litigation, there is a broader consequence for
patent law itself. The failure to raise a properly formulated
allegation of invalidity will generally foreclose a formal appellate
review, despite the recent instances where the issue was raised,
sua sponte, at the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court. In
view of the existence of a specialized appellate court for patent
appeals, the Federal Circuit, a goal of which is to aggregate
doctrinal formulation in patent law, this lack is particularly
unfortunate. The absence of otherwise credible debates over
patentable subject matter during litigation may preclude a
necessary review of PTO practices which cause patents to issue
that unduly encroach subject matter belonging in the public
domain. Some of the procedural difficulties in identifying the
issue of patentable subject matter can be traced to the
substantive difficulties in understanding the boundaries between
the allowable categories of invention in 35 U.S.C. § 101 and the
judicially-created exclusions of laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas from patent protection. Part III
further explores the identity and purpose of these judicially-
created exclusions.
III. THE EXCLUSIONS FROM ELIGIBILITY
Discussions about the border conflicts which place subject
matter either inside or outside the intellectual property regimes
can take place within two different baseline assumptions. One
view regards the unprotectable as "exceptions" to a regime of
intellectual property, while the other view regards the
protectable as "exceptions" to a public domain. Which domain-
public or private-is the default? The Supreme Court has stated
that "free exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which the
protection of a federal patent is the exception,"10 6 and that "a
patent is an exception to the general rule against monopolies."'10 7
These views suggest the extraordinary nature of the patent grant
105 See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying discussion.
106 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989).
107 Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816
(1945).
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and its instrumentalist role as "the ultimate goal of the patent
system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public
domain through disclosure."10 8 If the public domain is therefore
viewed as the default domain, then a discussion and analysis of the
subject matter that it contains is essential. 10 9 Professor Merges
notes: "The pervasiveness of IP rights has raised our awareness of
the importance and strategic uses of the public domain."110
Formal exclusions within intellectual property law are
observed in several distinct areas. Within U.S. patent law, there
are several statutory exclusions. No patents can issue for
nuclear weapons or related inventions.1  In addition, the
enforceability of medical procedure patents against health care
providers is limited.11 2 The European Patent Convention ("EPC")
enumerates specific exclusions from patentability.1 1 3 The Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") treaty
recognizes the ability of member states to exclude certain
categories of invention.11 4 U.S. copyright law specifically details
a formal list of exclusions. 1 5
10s Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 151.
109 See Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 215, 267 (2002) (stating that the public domain is "conceived of as
common property, owned by the public at large, which could not be alienated by the
Government, except under the carefully limited provisions of the Patent and
Copyright Clause").
110 Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 183, 184 (2004).
M1 See 42 U.S.C. § 2181 (2000).
112 See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000).
113 See EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION art. 52 (2002), available at
http://www.european-patent-office.org/epc/pdfLe.htm. Article 52(2) includes the
exclusions of "(a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods; (b)
aesthetic creations; (c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts,
playing games or doing business, and programs for computers; and (d) presentation
of information . . . as such." See id.
114 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Final Act of the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994,
Annex 1C, art. 27, available at http://www.wto.org/englishldocs e/legal-e/ 2 7-
trips.pdf. 'Members may exclude from patentability inventions.., to protect ordre
public or morality .... [or] may also exclude.. . diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical
methods for the treatment of humans or animals; [and] plants and animals other
than microorganisms .... See id. Professor Chisum notes that the above EPC
exclusions are "[n]otably missing" from the TRIPS treaty. See 1 CHISUM, supra note
1, § 1.01, at 1-10 & n.28 (2005).
115 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). Comparisons to copyright law are apt in view
of the common constitutional origin of the patent and copyright regimes. Both arise
from Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, of the Constitution, in which Congress is granted
the power "To promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for
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In addition to the statutory exclusions, there is a long history
of judicially created doctrines of exclusion in patent law. 116 These
additional sources of definition for patentable subject matter
reveal that it is not possible to take the formal categories of
invention in 35 U.S.C. § 101 at face value, and, as a result, they
have been referred to as "terms of art."'117  Patent law
jurisprudence reveals the rise and fall of a number of doctrines
which, at one time, functioned as categorical exclusions to
prevent the issuance of certain types of patents. The so-called
mental steps doctrine, function of a machine, and business
methods exceptions to patentable subject matter no longer exist
as credible bases for rejecting potential subject matter. 118 In a
history of Judge Rich and the evolution of patentable subject
matter during his tenure at the C.C.P.A. and the Federal Circuit,
Professor Oddi summarized Judge Rich's rationale for the
gradual elimination of formal exclusions from patentable subject
matter, including the business method at issue in State Street1 19:
"Unless there was binding precedent adopting this exception,
there was no rational basis for treating business methods
differently from any other methods that produce a useful,
concrete, and tangible result. '120
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
116 "[T]he following are not within the statutory categories of subject matter
enumerated in § 101 and its predecessor statutes as interpreted through the years:
principles, laws of nature, mental processes, intellectual concepts, ideas, natural
phenomena, mathematical formulae, methods of calculation, fundamental truths,
original causes [and] motives." In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 965 (C.C.P.A. 1979),
vacated sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980), affid, 447 U.S. 303
(1980).
117 See Kreiss, supra note 16, at 58 ("[T]he words 'process,' 'machine,'
'manufacture,' and 'composition of matter' are terms of art and neither the statutory
language of § 101 nor the legislative history concerning that section can be relied
upon to determine the scope of meaning of these words.").
118 See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149
F.3d 1368, 1375-77 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (eliminating the business methods exception); In
re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 885-86, 890-93 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (eliminating the mental
steps doctrine); In re Tarczy-Hornoch, 397 F.2d 856, 866-68 (C.C.P.A. 1968)
(eliminating the function of a machine doctrine).
119 149 F.3d 1368, 1375-77 (Fed. Cir. 1998). There is criticism, particularly, of
the decisions to allow the patenting of computer programs and business methods.
See, e.g., Dratler, supra note 21, at 879-82; Moy, supra note 21, at 86-90.
120 A. Samuel Oddi, Assault on the Citadel: Judge Rich and Computer-Related
Inventions, 39 HoUS. L. REV. 1033, 1096 (2002-2003). For a critique of the blurring
of the lines between the separate doctrines of patentable subject matter and utility
in State Street, see John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C.
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The judicially created exceptions to patentable subject
matter which remain are those which have been reiterated by the
Supreme Court as recently as 2005, namely, laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. 121 There are several
sources of confusion about the trilogy of exclusions, but the
questions can be conceptually divided into two categories. What
are the definitions of laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas? Why are these categories excluded, particularly
when an invention is claimed so as to fall into one of the formal
classes of patentable subject matter? 122 It is also possible to
invert the concept of exclusions and ask a different question:
what is protected for public use?
At the start, one could ask whether it matters whether these
categories are ill-defined or under-reasoned. Definitional
ambiguity appears in other areas of the law. However, patent
law places a high value on clarity and linguistic precision, as
illustrated by the strict disclosure requirements for the award of
patent rights. 123 Both the specification and claims in a patent
should exhibit, as much as possible, an exactitude which allows
the public to understand what is patented and what it not. The
patent statute should also provide notice regarding the limits of
eligibility, which will be discussed in Part V, infra.
The trilogy of exclusions are not necessarily unrelated. In
fact, it is possible to have instances where several of the
exclusions apply to a particular subject matter sought to be
patented. A natural phenomenon might be described in such
abstract terms that it also becomes an "abstract idea." For
example, there is definitional heterogeneity in case law and in
legal scholarship about the subject matter (electromagnetism) of
the proposed invention in O'Reilly v. Morse,124 which is variously
described as a "natural phenomenon"' 25 or as a "principle"'' 26 or
L. REV. 1139, 1160 (1999).
121 See supra note 91.
122 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
123 The disclosure requirements include those of written description,
enablement, best mode, and definiteness. 35 U.S.C § 112, first and second
paragraphs.
124 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
125 In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 990 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (Baldwin, J., concurring),
vacated sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980), aff'd, 447 U.S. 303
(1980).
126 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 592 (1978).
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"abstract idea"'127 or "law[ of nature."'128  Further analysis of
Morse occurred in In re Bergy: "Although the Court did not use
the words 'phenomenon of nature,' it is apparent that claim 8 was
held improper because by disclaiming all apparatus limitations,
Morse was attempting to define the limits of his invention in
terms of the natural phenomenon of electromagnetism and
would, therefore, preempt the use of this phenomenon."'129 Thus,
Morse certainly stands as a paradigmatic case for the exclusion of
natural phenomena, and aids an understanding of what the
courts might recognize as such. However, one can distinguish
between an invention which could be described as a "natural
phenomenon" and the actual claiming of the same invention,
which could be written so broadly as to make it also an "abstract
idea." Both prohibitions might be applicable.
A general distinction could be drawn between the prohibition
on patenting natural phenomena and laws of nature versus the
patenting of abstract ideas. The prohibition on patenting
abstract ideas was particularly prominent in the disputes over
the patenting of computer-related inventions, as the
mathematical algorithms which were central to these inventions
were sometimes described as abstract ideas.130 At times, an
algorithm was also described as a "law of nature."'131 However,
the lingering prominence of the abstract idea exclusion has led to
suggestions that this is the only credible exclusion from
patentable subject matter at the present time.1 32 The concurrent
127 Kreiss, supra note 16, at 69 (characterizing the Morse decision as a
prohibition on the patenting of an abstract idea and on a claim of excessive scope).
128 1 ERNEST BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB III, WALKER ON PATENTS 157 (3d ed. 1984)
(describing Claim 8 as directed to a law of nature).
129 Bergy, 596 F.2d at 990.
130 See Kreiss, supra note 16, at 68 ("Purely mathematical algorithms provide
one illustration of the theory that abstract ideas are not patentable.").
131 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) ("Reasoning that an algorithm, or
mathematical formula, is like a law of nature, Benson applied the established rule
that a law of nature cannot be the subject of a patent.").
132 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1575, 1642 (2003) ("[T]he most significant remaining exception is the rule
against the patenting of abstract ideas. The rule originated in the case of O'Reilly v.
Morse, which involved Samuel Morse's patent on the telegraph."). The authors
describe this prohibition as a meaningful policy lever in patent law, serving as a
limitation on patents of undue scope and preventing the patenting of "abstract ideas
and natural rules"--including E=mc2. Id. at 1643. The abstract idea exclusion is
likely to surface again with respect to the recent decision by the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences in Ex parte Lundgren, Appeal No. 2003-2088 (B.P.A.I.
2004) (involving a patent on a method of manager compensation not requiring any
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existence of disclosure defects that can accompany a claim to an
abstract idea might account for its greater visibility.
Rationales for the exclusion of the laws of nature, natural
phenomena and abstract ideas cannot be described with
precision. 133 However, the Court did comment in Gottschalk v.
Benson: "Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental
processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable,
as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work." 134
The absence of extensive justifications by the Court may speak
for itself.135
If the eligibility of computer-related inventions was
particularly shaped by the prohibition against the patenting of
abstract ideas, inventions in the biological sciences have been
particularly shaped by the prohibitions on natural phenomena
and products of nature. 36 The natural phenomena which have
been presented to the patent system have a logical relationship
to the category of "laws of nature." If laws of nature are
understood to provide a mechanistic underpinning for observed
phenomena, then they are implicitly referenced when actual
phenomena are presented, and can illustrate the relationships
between such phenomena.' 37 Yet, the prohibition on patenting
laws of nature can result in an absurd kind of legal reductionism
if a distinction is not made between the embodiments of physical
software-related implementation).
133 See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 31, at 77 ("Despite the imprecision in its
formulation, the rule is the primary doctrinal tool by which the courts limit the
category of patentable subject matter.").
134 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
135 With respect to the trilogy of exclusions, Professor Samuelson described the
Court's view in Diehr as "that such discoveries are merely recognizing what was
already in existence, rather than creating something new." Samuelson, Benson
Revisited, supra note 16, at 1097.
136 For example, the prohibition on the patenting of natural phenomena was
raised in Kemin Foods, L.C. v. Pigmentos Vegetales Del Centro S.A. De C.V, 357 F.
Supp. 2d 1105 (S.D. Iowa 2005), and Monsanto Co. v. Good, 2004 WL 1664013 (D.
N.J. July 23, 2004), discussed supra Part II. For discussions of the product of nature
doctrine, see supra note 20. Both prohibitions were articulated late in the petition
phase of LabCorp v. Metabolite, see supra notes 92-98.
137 "There is also a rhythm and a pattern between the phenomena of nature
which is not apparent to the eye, but only to the eye of analysis; and it is these
rhythms and patterns which we call Physical Laws." RICHARD FEYNMAN, THE
CHARACTER OF PHYSICAL LAW 13 (1965).
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laws and the laws themselves, such that all entities are judged to
be the unpatentable expression of underlying natural laws. 138
If one tries to calibrate the harms which can result from the
patenting of a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or an abstract
idea, how are they to be understood? In other words, what is the
cost? There is consensus that the protection of these entities is
maintained so that they remain in the public domain for use by
all. If one were to phrase a cause of action against the patenting
of, for example, a law of nature, it would be that such patenting
results in "preemption" of the law of nature-that which should
be public is now privately controlled. It could be argued that
there are shadow doctrines behind each exclusion from
patentable subject matter which amplify why they cannot be
patented. The patenting of natural phenomena and laws of
nature most directly implicates issues of novelty, while the
patenting of abstract ideas would be most immediately objected
to on disclosure grounds. 139 This is not to suggest that these
exclusions are redundant to existing doctrines-the Supreme
Court certainly adheres to the categorical exclusions from
patentable subject matter as the meaningful components of a
public domain.
Limits on patentable subject matter in the biological sciences
have most often encountered the prohibition on the patenting of
natural phenomena, 140 but increasing reductionism in the life
sciences will likely reveal underlying mechanisms of biological
function that could make the law of nature exclusion more
relevant.141 Because of the doctrinal underdevelopment of the
138 These warnings are explicit in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 n.12
(1981), where the Court stated that the acceptance of such an analysis would, "if
carried to its extreme, make all inventions unpatentable because all inventions can
be reduced to underlying principles of nature which, once known, make their
implementation obvious."
139 The implication of novelty as a rationale for the bar against patenting
products of nature and laws of nature can also be approached by invoking the
doctrine of inherency, in cases where the prior art implicitly disclosed or provided
the public the benefit of the product or law of nature. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A.
Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371, 408 (2005).
140 See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) ("He
who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a
monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a
discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful
end.").
141 Reductionism underlies the modern research imperative to investigate
biological phenomena at its most fundamental level in order to understand structure
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law of nature exclusion and its potential for protecting scientific
knowledge in modern biological science, this Article next
considers how patentable subject matter may be limited when
laws of nature remain in the public domain.
IV. THE PATENT INELIGIBILITY OF LAWS OF NATURE
A deeper understanding of the concept of a law of nature and
its intersection with patent law can contribute to the project of
defining the contours of the public domain with respect to both
the physical and the biological sciences. This investigation into
the laws of nature as protected entities within the patent scheme
can be informed by patent jurisprudence 142 and the philosophy of
science. 143 The identity and function of a law of nature has been
a recurring analytic problem for the philosophy of science. As a
field that investigates the structure and foundation of scientific
knowledge, it studies the essential tasks of the scientific
enterprise: "The study and discovery of the laws of nature are,
after all, two of the major tasks of science."'144
Historically, science itself, as a distinct field of knowledge,
originates from the general field of philosophy, such that science
came to be formulated as "natural philosophy."145 This origin is
reflected in early patent cases, such as O'Reilly v. Morse. 46
"[T]he discovery of a principle in natural philosophy or physical
science, is not patentable."'' 47 In Whittemore v. Cutter,148 the
"original elementary principles of motion, which philosophy and
science have discovered"' 49 were not considered to be principles
for which an inventor could be granted a patent. The
and function.
142 For a historical treatment of the laws of nature in patent jurisprudence, see
Kane, supra note 15, at 745-756.
143 The philosophy of science is a branch of philosophy. "In its broadest terms,
the philosophy of science is the investigation of philosophical questions that arise
from reflecting on science. What makes these questions philosophical is their
generality, their fundamental character, and their resistance to solution by
empirical disciplines such as history, sociology, and psychology." MARTIN CURD &
J.M. COVER, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: THE CENTRAL ISSUES xvii (1998).
144 STEPHEN MUMFORD, LAWS IN NATURE 4 (2004).
145 PETER GODFREY-SMITH, THEORY AND REALITY 4 (2003).
146 O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
147 Id. at 116.
148 29 F. Cas. 1123 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,601).
149 Id. at 1124.
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intertwining of science and philosophy shapes commentary in
Nineteenth Century patent jurisprudence.
Philosophers of science strongly disagree as to the existence
of laws of nature, although it is possible to identify consensus
attributes which have emerged in discussions of the concept. 150
Views range from those who defend the concept of laws of nature
as necessary-independent of human enterprise-to those who
simply view laws of nature as regularities which are observed
and noted by human actors.151 In contrast, a third point of view
holds that there are no laws of nature, because many so-called
laws of nature have exceptions or require special conditions for
their uniform character to emerge. 152
Although patent law jurisprudence has not provided any
clear definition of a law of nature, there are signature examples
offered by the Supreme Court, and these are explicitly described
as laws. Here is a clear example, offered in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty: "Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated
law that E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of
gravity. Such discoveries are 'manifestations of... nature, free
to all men and reserved exclusively to none.' "153
If we take the two explicit mentions of "laws" from this
excerpt, we have the Court offering two exemplars for laws of
nature that cannot be the subject of a patent grant. Are these
examples helpful for identifying other instances when the patent
system is confronted with a law of nature? In addition to its
mention by the Court, E=mc2 is an equation with a wide
following in the scientific community as a paradigmatic law of
nature.1 54 Newton's law of universal gravitation also enjoys wide
150 See RONALD N. GIERE, SCIENCE WITHOUT LAWS 86 (1999) (identifying the
characteristics of laws of nature identified by modern philosophers of science as true
statements of universal form, possessed of both contingency and necessity, and as
objective, meaning that they exist apart from human cognitive structures).
151 See CURD & COVER, supra note 143, at 805-07.
152 See NANCY CARTWRIGHT, HOW THE LAWS OF PHYSICS LIE 54 (1983) ("For the
fundamental laws of physics do not describe true facts about reality. Rendered as
descriptions of facts, they are false; amended to be true, they lose their fundamental,
explanatory force.").
153 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
154 See MICHAEL GUILLEN, FIVE EQUATIONS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 5
(1995) (a book focused on "the small number of mathematical equations that have
influenced our existence in such profound and intimate ways," including E=mc2 as
one of its examples); Kenneth Chang, What Makes An Equation Beautiful, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, § 4, at 12 (describing a survey of readers of Physics World
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acclaim, even from those who are skeptical of the actual existence
of laws of nature. 155 However, several inferences might be drawn
from these judicially-cited examples that inadvertently
contribute to narrow, context-specific conclusions and an under-
appreciation for the inherent expansiveness of the concept of
laws of nature. First, both of these examples are drawn from the
field of physics, with the possible consequence that other fields of
science are either not considered to have their own versions of
laws of nature, or that their versions must conform to existing
models. 156  Second, both of these laws of nature have a
mathematical character which furthers explanatory power, but
which may not be a necessary attribute for a law of nature. 157
Third, both laws are also identified by the names of their
discoverers, i.e., Einstein and Newton, with the possible
consequence that all laws of nature are thought to arise from the
work of a single, well-known genius, accompanied by an
attendant mystique and celebrity. 158 Such an assumption would
contravene the reality of much modern scientific work, which is
magazine, asking "Which equations are the greatest?" in which E=mc 2 was one of the
top entries).
155 See D. M. ARMSTRONG, WHAT IS A LAW OF NATURE? 7 (1983).
We now know that Newton's Law of Universal Gravitation is not really a
law. Yet we also know that Newton's formula approximates to the truth for
at least a wide range of phenomena. Its predictive power would be
inexplicable otherwise. So it makes a very good stand-in for a paradigm of a
law of nature.
Id.
156 See CARTWRIGHT, supra note 152, at 54 (challenging reliance on physics as
the dominant scientific paradigm, and stating: "It is customary to take the
fundamental explanatory laws of physics as the ideal. Maxwell's equations, or
Schroedinger's, or the equations of general relativity, are paradigms, paradigms
upon which all other laws-laws of chemistry, biology, thermodynamics, or particle
physics-are to be modelled [sic].").
157 See GIERE, supra note 150, at 88 (discussing the origin of the concept of law
of nature in the philosophy of science and stating: '"Would the concept of laws of
nature have gained such currency in the absence of simple mathematical
relationships which could be taken [to] express such laws? And do not the qualities
of universality and necessity also attach to mathematical relationships? These
questions are as difficult as they are relevant."). This physics-dominated view of the
laws of nature also appears in legal scholarship. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 132,
at 408 (stating that it "is the language of mathematics in which such laws are
expressed").
158 See CURD & COVER, supra note 143, at 805 ("Undoubtedly, much scientific
activity is devoted to discovering laws, and one of the most cherished forms of
scientific immortality is to join the ranks of Boyle, Newton, and Maxwell by having a
law (equation or functional relation) linked with one's name."). The paradigmatic
laws of nature exclusively cite male scientists.
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collaborative and group-driven. Fourth, these laws were cited by
the Court at a time when their significance was well-
established, 159 with the possible consequence that a law of nature
is understood only in hindsight, and most assuredly at a time
when any possible patenting would additionally fail for lack of
novelty. Such a rearview mirror image of a law of nature would
render the patent law exclusion meaningless, as it could not be
used to shape any vital, contemporaneous public domain.
Patent jurisprudence provides other examples of scientific
relationships which cannot be patented such as the Pythagorean
theorem defining geometric relationships (a2=b2+c2),160 the
formula for determining the circumference of a circle (C=2irr),161
the Arrhenius equation, 162 or the multiplication tables. 63 A
common attribute of these exclusions is the existence of an
equation or formula that defines a fixed relationship.
Does the concept of a law of nature map onto the biological
sciences? Clearly, patent law to date has conceived of such laws
using examples drawn from physics. In parallel, the philosophy
of science has struggled with whether laws of nature appear in
the biological sciences. 64 Why was this question necessary? One
reason is that assumptions about the unity of science have
influenced the intellectual development of each developing field
of science, such that the modern age of biological science may be
viewed through cognitive structures developed in physics,
resulting in theoretical assumptions regarding similarities
between disciplines which do not appear in practice. There is an
argument that the "disunity of science" is a more accurate
statement of scientific endeavor, and that biological science
159 Newton's law of gravity was published in Principia in 1687. See PETER J.
BOWLER & IWAN RHYS MORUS, MAKING MODERN SCIENCE 47 (2005). Einstein
published his equation in 1905. See DAVID BODANIS, E = MC 2: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE
WORLD'S MOST FAMOUS EQUATION 7 (2000).
16o See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 965 (C.C.P.A. 1979), vacated sub nom.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980), affld, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
161 See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 (1978).
162 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981).
163 See Flook, 437 U.S. at 598 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
164 See GODFREY-SMITH, supra note 145, at 201 ("Over many years, philosophers
searched fields like biology for statements of laws of nature.").
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presents unique analytic difficulties. 165 The intellectual concepts
that shape its public domain may need to reflect this complexity.
It appears that "law of nature" in patent law can be called a
term of art, in that the examples provided by the courts relate to
scientific relationships which might be contested by some as true
laws of nature. 166 For example, Newton's law of Universal
Gravitation did not survive as an exception-less law, and there is
commentary noting that Einstein's formula is not generally
described as a law at all. 167 This conceptual fluidity can be
advantageous: a dynamic view of laws of nature recognizes that
such intellectual creations have an instrumental role which may
change over time.
A scientific law, even one exclusively about what we can
observe, goes beyond the data available, because it makes a
claim which if true is true everywhere and always, not just in
the experience of the scientist who formulates the scientific law.
This of course makes science fallible: the scientific law, our
current best-estimate hypothesis, may turn out to be, in fact
usually does turn out to be, wrong. But it is by experiment that
we discover this, and by experiment that we improve on it,
presumably getting closer to the natural law we seek to
discover.168
It is interesting to compare this theme of adaptability in the
philosophy of science with the Constitutional mandate to
"promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts."169 The
evolution of a science requires knowledge tools which advance
the field, and the patent law concept of "laws of nature" can
represent the protection of intellectual tools which are used to
165 See ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, INSTRUMENTAL BIOLOGY OR THE DISUNITY OF
SCIENCE 6 (1994) (noting the high degree of complexity posed by biological systems,
and stating: "If we were very much smarter, biological theory would be very
different, but physical and chemical theory would not be.").
166 See Kreiss, supra note 117, observing that the named categories of
patentable subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101 may also be terms ofart.
167 See MUMFORD, supra note 144, at 137. In another context, Professor
Samuelson observed that the debate over the patenting of mathematical formulae
encountered the philosophical dilemma as to whether such tools are invented or
discovered and noted: "It quite obviously makes no sense to make the patentability
of mathematical formulae turn on whether they are 'invented' or 'discovered,' for it is
impossible to know for certain which is the case." Samuelson, Benson Revisited,
supra note 16, at 1097 n.274.
168 ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: A CONTEMPORARY
INTRODUCTION 112 (2000).
169 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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conceptualize uncovered knowledge in order to advance
understanding. Does biology have laws of nature? Modern
biological research offers some examples. A law of nature
underlies the central dogma in molecular biology, namely, the
genetic code that defines the relationship between DNA and
protein, and preemption of this law of nature undermines the
legitimacy of DNA gene patents.170  Other molecular
relationships in biology can be defined similarly. The inverse
quantitative relationship between homocysteine and folate or
between homocysteine and cobalamin in the patent at issue in
LabCorp is a paradigmatic example of many binary metabolic
relationships which can qualify as laws of nature. 171 The validity
of any such patent, therefore, must be assessed in view of its
possible preemption of the law of nature-does the scientific
relationship itself become captured by the patent? Has the
scientific community lost meaningful access to the use of this law
of nature?
Laws of nature in biology must be understood in context.
Any requirement that a law in biology have absolutely universal
application cannot be sustained in view of taxonomic diversity,
but species-specific knowledge tools are no less essential for
scientific work, and may properly be called laws of nature as they
become the working truths that describe biological phenomena.
Moreover, notions of permanent knowledge structures in the
biological sciences must also contend with evolutionary
development and change, a reality that can be addressed with a
dynamic conception of laws of nature.
If laws of nature are so defined, increasing reductionism in
the biological sciences may actually revive and make relevant the
seemingly obscure law of nature prohibition, as modern
biochemical investigation identifies specific molecular actors and
their relationships, leading to patents which attempt to capture
these subcellular activities.' 72 Developments in nanotechnology
170 Kane, supra note 15, at 752.
171 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 601 (2005) (No. 04-
607). Professor Kreiss notes: "The existence of statistical correlations between a
particular biological test and a particular genetic or biological condition is another
example of a law of nature." Kreiss, supra note 16, at 67 n.251.
172 Modern biological research is concerned with the identification of new
molecules, such as genes and proteins, and with deciphering relationships between
such molecules. Many binary relationships, such as inverse or direct quantitative
correlations in metabolic cycles, or relay molecular sequences in a signal
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could also pose similar dilemmas at the level of atomic or
subatomic structure. 173 It is important that the laws of nature be
acknowledged contemporaneously with their characterization, in
order that the progress that they facilitate does not await the
expiration of a patent term. A vigilance over the encroachment
of patenting on fundamental scientific relationships is required
in order that the prohibition against private appropriation of the
laws of nature is meaningfully observed.
V. THE RELEVANCE OF PATENT ELIGIBILITY
Patent eligibility is a doctrine which often reappears when
new technologies or scientific imperatives create the possibility of
patenting novel forms of subject matter. It may lie dormant, but
it is not obsolete. The doctrine frequently appears to be invisible
in the scheme of statutory requirements for patenting, yet it has
a distinct gatekeeping function. Because the patentable subject
matter doctrine has the delicate role of safeguarding the
scientific public domain, it is essential that all stakeholders in
the patent system appreciate the availability of the doctrine and
its potential. At the level of patent prosecution, PTO review for
compliance should take note of the inclusions and the exclusions
from patentable subject matter. 174 Patent examiners have few
transduction pathway, could be described in claim terms that might result in private
capture of such relationships, which could be described as laws of nature.
173 Research in nanotechnology identifies atomic-level materials and structures
which exhibit physical properties that diverge from those observed at the larger
molecular level. Nanoscience is, at its simplest, "the study of the fundamental
principles of molecules and structures with at least one dimension roughly between
1 and 100 nanometers." MARK RATNER & DANIEL RATNER, NANOTECHNOLOGY; A
GENTLE INTRODUCTION TO THE NEXT BIG IDEA 7 (2003). It is not yet clear if discrete
doctrinal difficulties attach to patenting in this field. See generally Mark Lemley,
Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601 (2005) (discussing the likelihood of
future patent conflicts in the field). With respect to patentable subject matter, the
exclusions for natural phenomena and laws of nature might find application for
claimed inventions that describe naturally-existing material structures or for claims
that attempt to capture the properties observed by such entities or their mechanism
of action. Lemley observes that to date, the prohibition on patenting abstract ideas
would not have precluded any of the basic patents he identifies in nanotechnology,
although the product of nature doctrine might have prevented the patenting of
buckminsterfullerines (carbon-60). Id. at 614 n.63; see also Burk & Lemley, supra
note 132.
174 Several recent cases illustrate this vigilance. In re Bowman, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d
1669 (B.A.P.I. 2001), involved a PTO rejection for an invention characterized as
"nothing more than an abstract idea which is not tied to any technological art,
environment, or machine." Id. at 1671. In In re Bonczyk, 10 F. App'x. 908 (Fed. Cir.
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explicit prohibitions left when they examine for patentable
subject matter, but those that remain are a product of the
Supreme Court's insistence on limits which preserve a public
domain.
If it is possible to assume that the possession of patentable
subject matter is considered during patent prosecution, that
assumption does not apply to patent litigation. The likelihood
that a lack of patentable subject matter will be raised in
litigation is less than the other available statutory grounds for
invalidity. Although the issue may not be relevant in many
patent disputes, the discussion in Part II described instances
where the issue only surfaced in a latent or indirect manner.
There are several consequences from the relative invisibility of
the patentable subject matter doctrine in litigation. First, a
litigant may lose an opportunity for a legitimate challenge to a
patent containing questionable subject matter. Second, the
nature of inter partes litigation offers an advantage for doctrinal
development that is lacking in patent prosecution. 175 While there
is always a possibility that a trial court will act sua sponte where
needed, such reliance is not realistic in view of Professor Rai's
observation of "the reality that patent law is suffused with
complicated findings of scientific fact"176  and resulting
suggestions that the creation of a specialized trial court for
patent law might be necessary. 177 In view of the specialized
2001), the Federal Circuit upheld a PTO rejection for an invention it characterized
as an "attempt to claim a form of energy," noting that "[e]nergy... is a natural
phenomenon that does not qualify as patentable subject matter." Id. at 911.
175 Donald S. Chisum notes that ex parte Patent Office adjudication in the
absence of persons with active adverse interests results in decisions based on a
record which is only the product of the applicant. If an appeal by such an applicant
can be taken to the Supreme Court, for example, public input is possible through the
filing of amicus curiae briefs by third parties interested in the policy implications of
the decision. Professor Chisum further notes that an advantage of a fully litigated,
inter partes infringement suit is that fact-finding relevant to the impact of the
patentable subject matter resolution can occur, with the potential for more specific
consideration of the impact of granting a specific patent. Donald S. Chisum, supra
note 16, n.44 (specifically referring to public interest in the outcome of Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), noting that the decision in that case would affect a whole
category of inventions relating to computer software).
176 Arti K. Rai, Patent System Reform: Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating
Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877, 897 (2002).
177 Id.; see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing
Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 769, 798 (2004); Kimberly A.
Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1 (2001) (reviewing the difficulties faced by district court judges in claim
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expertise of the Federal Circuit, the absence of opportunities to
review serious allegations regarding the absence of patentable
subject matter is unfortunate. Although there are criticisms of
excessive forays into fact-finding on the part of the Federal
Circuit, 178 the issue of patentable subject matter might benefit
from a slightly more activist stance. Following the recent
initiative of the Supreme Court with respect to patentable
subject matter in LabCorp,1 79 judicial vigilance during patent
disputes may result in further instance of the issue being raised
by the courts sua sponte. o80  Certainly, the Court's recent
reminder of its protection of laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas from private appropriation signals an
intention to maintain vigilance over the boundaries of patentable
subject matter.
There is no statutory recognition of the judicially created
exclusions from patentability. This omission could contribute to
their invisibility, and to a societal impression that patent law has
no limits. A positive legislative enactment, stating that "the
following are not eligible for patenting: laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas" could more effectively place this
protected subject matter within public view.181  Such an
enactment would act as legislative bolstering of the
constitutional mandate, "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
the useful Arts,"18 2 because it would signal the express protection
of "the basic tools of scientific and technological work"8 3 that
facilitate the progress of scientific research. There is precedent
for codification of judicially created doctrines in intellectual
property law with special importance for the public domain, such
as the idea-expression dichotomy18 4 and the fair use defense in
construction).
178 See Dreyfuss, supra note 177, at 798; Rai, supra note 176, at 877; William C.
Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity: The Federal Circuit's
Discomfort with its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 725 (2000)
(describing Federal Circuit practice of factual inquiry at an appellate level of
review).
179 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 601 (2005) (No. 04-
607).
180 See supra Part II.
181 Such a proposed revision could be codified as 35 U.S.C. § 101(b).
182 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
183 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
184 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). The doctrine was created in Baker v. Selden, 101
U.S. 99 (1879), and generally allows protection of the expression of an idea, but not
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copyright law.18 5 This Article proposes that the patent law
exclusions be expressly codified, in order to provide the
possibility for a legislative record and to provide public notice, in
particular, to the scientific community. Although codification
would not guarantee clarity regarding the definition of laws of
nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas, an express
recognition in the statute would incorporate the
acknowledgement of a public domain that must coexist with
private patent rights. Formal notice of this public/private
boundary would facilitate the recruitment of scientists to the
analytic project of defining the scientific public domain, which is
essential in view of the complexity of modern science.
Further reductionism in the research programs of twenty-
first century science (such as genomic, proteomics,
bioinformatics, and nanotechnology) suggests that patenting
efforts at the margins of the unpatentable may be more likely.
For example, it is possible to imagine that patenting efforts in
nanotechnology, the science of atomic structure and performance,
of the idea itself. The legislative record suggests that its incorporation in the 1976
Copyright was an attempt to make the copyright statute comprehensive. The House
Report stated: "Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or contracts the scope of copyright
protection under the present law. Its purpose is to restate, in the context of the new
single Federal system of copyright, that the basic dichotomy between expression and
idea remains unchanged." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 57 (1976), as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N, 5659, 5670.
185 Fair use is a defense in copyright law codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 in the 1976
Copyright Act. This codification per se did not create clarity about the doctrine and
its application. The House Report stated:
Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine
over and over again, no real definition of the concept has ever emerged.
Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally
applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question must be
decided on its own facts.
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N., 5659, 5679.
Professor Litman reported the limits and benefits of codification:
Each of these general limitations originated in judicial opinions of the
nineteenth century. Each appeared in the 1976 Act in response to
particular concerns. The codification process introduced its own distortions.
The useful articles doctrine, for example, ceased to be a general limitation
and became instead a peculiarity of copyright in pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works. The fair use doctrine became encumbered with the
idiosyncratic needs of educational users. These doctrines are, however, the
most flexible limitations the statute offers in order to balance its expansive
rights and broad subject matter.
Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV.
275, 341-42 (1989).
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might generate conflicts which further test the limits of the
exclusions of natural phenomena and laws of nature.186 The
investigations into cellular and subcellular functions in genomics
and proteomics could generate patenting efforts which intersect
with the product of nature doctrine and/or the prohibition on
patenting laws and phenomena of nature.18 7 Drawing on insights
from the philosophy of science, this Article has articulated a
dynamic conception of laws of nature which is
contemporaneously useful and which comports with the mandate
of the patent system to "promote progress" in the relevant
disciplines. Laws of nature in the life sciences must be regarded
as working truths for a particular field, reflecting the
evolutionary developments and taxonomic diversity that
distinguish biology from physics.
Several trends suggest that conflicts over patentable subject
matter could emerge more, not less, frequently in the future. The
future development of a formal opposition procedure in U.S.
patent law could offer the first opportunity for diverse
stakeholders to challenge patents for lack of patentable subject
matter, as this will likely be one of the available formal grounds
for such oppositions.188 Such an opposition procedure would
necessarily facilitate wider public participation in "the care and
feeding of the public domain."18 9 The likelihood that challenges
for lack of patentable subject matter do not surface in patent
litigation because of the shared bias of similarly situated parties
suggests a role for dispassionate observers. In tandem with new
procedural opportunities, the increased involvement of a vigorous
public interest sector in intellectual property policy will likely
result in renewed vigilance at the borders of patentable subject
matter. 190
186 See, e.g., Albert P. Halluin & Lorelei P. Westin, Nanotechnology: The
Importance of Intellectual Property Rights in an Emerging Technology, 86 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'y 220 (2004) (describing initial encounters of nanotechnology
with the patent system).
187 See Kane, supra note 15, at 712-13.
188 See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 324 (2005). "The
issues of invalidity that may be considered during the opposition proceeding are
double patenting and any of the requirements for patentability set forth in sections
101, 102, 103, 112 and 251(d)."
189 See Merges, supra note 110, at 184.
190 For example, the Public Patent Foundation ("PubPat") is a public interest
organization formed in 2003 which "represents the public's interests against the
harms caused by the patent system, particularly the harms caused by wrongly
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Although conflicts over patentable subject matter are
infrequent, they are not trivial. Access to the "basic tools of
scientific and technological work"' 91 must be preserved. The
prohibitions on patenting laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas can be interpreted broadly or narrowly, with
consequences for the integrity of the patent system and the
progress of the scientific enterprise. The goals of each,
theoretically, are not in conflict.
issued patents and unsound patent policy." Pub. Patent Found., http://www.pubpat.
org/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
191 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
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